rational. Plants have a nutritive soul, and among the parts of the soul of a non-human animal are the sensitive, imaginative, and appetitive. Which is not to say that the appetitive part of an animal's soul is of precisely the same kind as the appetitive part of a human's, for the rational part of a human soul contributes to the shaping of the appetitive part, whereas the appetitive part of an animal's soul is in no way affected by the animal's power of reason, for it has none.
These facts and many more concerning the nature of the human soul are known by the 'physician of the soul', a kind of wise man who, according to Maimonides, has an important role to play in society: 'Those with sick souls (ie vicious people) who do not recognise their illness but imagine they are healthy or who recognise it but do not submit to medical treatment will meet the fate of a sick man who pursues his pleasures and does not submit to medical treatment -he will undoubtedly perish.' Why will he perish? A crucial ingredient in all moral vices is that they have an essentially civic aspect; they lead to actions which work against the common good. And society has to protect itself, through its legal system, against those who engage in such actions. In addition Maimonides may have in mind his doctrine that salvation does not await the souls of the vicious. I shall return to this point at the end of this paper.
In stressing the civic nature of moral vice, and moral virtue also, Maimonides reveals his Aristotelian heritage. This is further revealed in his account of the relations between virtue and vice. Virtues and vices are classed as character traits, or habits, with each virtue a mean between two extremes, one an excess and the other a deficiency. He gives numerous examples: liberality is the mean between extravagance and miserliness, moderation the mean between lust and insensibility to pleasure, gentleness between irascibility and servility, and modesty between impudence and shyness. It is the fact that people are not born with virtues or vices but develop them by a process of habituation through frequent repetition, that provides the clue to the appropriate treatment of the morally sick: 'Should his soul become sick, he must follow the same course in treating it as in the medical treatment for bodies. For when the body gets out of equilibrium, we look to which side it inclines in becoming unbalanced, and then oppose it with its contrary until it returns to equilibrium. When it is in equilibrium, we remove that counterbalance and revert to that which keeps the body in equilibrium. We act in a similar manner with regard to moral habits.' For example, a person who has become miserly should make a practice of extravagance until he has ceased to be miserly, and then he can revert to the virtuous state of liberality.
Maimonides notes in this connection that often a given virtue is closer to one of the corresponding extremes than to the other. For example, liberality is closer to extravagance than to miserliness. 'This subtlety' he asserts 'is the rule of therapy and is its secret'. Since a person can more easily turn from extravagance to liberality than from miserliness to liberality, the extravagant person does not need to perform miserly acts as frequently as a miserly person needs to perform extravagant ones, as a means to recovering the virtuous path of liberality. Likewise, in order to regain his courage, the rash man need perform cowardly acts less often than the cowardly man must perform rash ones. Maimonides concludes: 'This is the rule for the medical treatment of moral habits, so memorise it'.
One implication of this is that the wise man, aware of a tendency he has towards one extreme, will incline towards the opposite extreme as a precaution. Sensing a tendency to lustful action he will tend to actions normally expressive of insensibility to pleasure; this will enable him to retain a moral equilibrium. The wisdom of such behaviour is obvious. The danger, noted by Maimonides, is that an ignorant person, misunderstanding the behaviour of the wise and thinking that insensibility is the path of virtue, will set about afflicting his body and thereby establishing a vicious habit in his soul instead of a virtuous one. Maimonides compares such a person to one who, ignorant of the art of medicine and observing the treatment being given to a deathly sick patient, argues that if the treatment is good for the sick it is even better for the healthy. 'Similarly' says Maimonides 'those with sick souls are undoubtedly so from taking medication while they are healthy' -not quite a description of psychiatrogenic illness since Maimonides is here supposing that the wrong medication was prescribed by the patient, not the doctor.
Maimonides is in general strongly hostile to excessive behaviour -frequent fastings and other abstinences are contrary to our nature which is Godgiven. A person should not act in such a way as wantonly to impair his physical well-being: 'He shall not inhabit caves or mountains, nor wear garments of hair and wool, nor torment his body or make it weary or afflict it. That is forbidden in the tradition which has come down to us.' Plainly such behaviour must be condemned as not in accordance with the mean. It is also contrary to God's law.
This point prompts the question of the relation between Maimonides's rabbinic inheritance and his Aristotelianism. He himself saw a harmony between the two. On the one hand we are required to seek the path of virtue by following the mean between excess and deficiency, and on the other hand God's law in various ways requires of us actions which will ensure our adherence to that same path of virtue. For example, 'You shall not take revenge nor bear a grudge' [Lev 19, 18] We are dealing here with more than a mere parallel, for the link between physical and moral well-beijng is causal: 'On the basis of this reasoning, the art of medicine is given a very large role with respect to the virtues, the knowledge of God, and attaining true happiness. To study it diligently is among the greatest acts of worship. It is, then, not like weaving and carpentry, for it enables us to perform our actions so that they become human actions, leading to the virtues and the truths.' Of course, this does not imply that one cannot be virtuous unless one is healthy. But People ofthe first class are virtuous tout court, and those of the second are said to be continent (or strong-willed, since they have to overcome desire in order to perform virtuous acts). It can be argued that people of the first kind are better since their desires are better directed; this is the position of 'the philosophers' (ie Aristotelians) as reported by Maimonides. But he reports that the sages take the opposite view: 'According to them, someone who craves and strongly desires transgressions is more virtuous and perfect than someone who does not crave them and suffers no pain in abstaining from them. They even said that the more virtuous and perfect an individual is, the stronger is both his craving for transgressions and his pain in abstaining from them.' Here is one point at which the two great traditions which Maimonides inherited appear in clear conflict. He seeks a resolution by the standard mediaeval means of drawing a distinction. There are some things which everyone judges to be bad, such as murder, theft, fraud, harming an innocent person, repaying a benefactor with evil, and degrading one's parents (these are Maimonides's examples). There are, on the other hand, acts which would not be bad were it not for the fact that God's law prohibits them, for example, mixing meat with milk. In the light of this distinction the opinion of the philosophers and that of the sages can both be accepted. For when the philosophers say that a person who acts virtuously in accordance with his desires is better than one who has to overcome contrary desires in order to act virtuously, they have in mind acts whose moral status is universally agreed upon. Thus someone who refuses to steal, and has no desire to steal, is better than one who refuses while yet having the desire; one who repays a 'benefactor with good and desires to repay him with good, is better than one who, while repaying him with good, yet desires to repay him with evil. On the other hand, when the sages say that the continent man is more virtuous they have in mind acts which are good solely because God has commanded them.
The distinction just made is not however entirely plain sailing. In particular the claim that certain acts which are good are so only because God commanded them, needs to be handled carefully. There was a longstanding disagreement, duly reflected in Maimonides's writings, especially in his great philosophical treatise The Guide of the Perplexed, concerning whether the laws of God are consequent solely upon His will, or are consequent also upon His wisdom and aim at some good. The very clearly expressed view of Maimonides is that all the laws of God are consequent upon His wisdom, even though we do not know in every case what it is about a law that makes it a wise one. However, it is possible to speak in general terms about this matter, even if the details now, and perhaps will always, elude us. 'The Law as a whole aims at two things: the well-being ofthe soul and the well-being of the body.' As regards the former, this consists of the possession of correct opinions about God and about man's place in creation. And the second is achieved through two things: (i) the prohibition on people acting according to their own will and up to the limits of their power, and (ii) the acquisition by each person of moral qualitites that are useful for life in society so that the affairs of the city are well ordered.
This last point reveals the place of political theory within Maimonides's system. We have two perfections, that of the body and that of the soul. Bodily perfection is physical good health, for which food, shelter, and so on, are required, and they can best be assured through political association. And perfection of the soul cannot be achieved unless perfection of the body is first achieved. As Maimonides puts the point: 'A man cannot cognize an intelligible even when taught to understand it and all the more cannot become aware of it on his own accord, if he is in pain or is very hungry or thirsty or is hot or is very cold. But once the first perfection is achieved it is possible to achieve the ultimate perfection, which is undoubtedly more noble and is the only cause of permanent preservation.' For Maimonides, therefore, the successful governance of a state can make a crucial difference to a person's chance of salvation. The nature of this ultimate perfection of soul to which Maimonides here alludes quickly becomes clear; he sums up his position by quoting Jeremiah: 'Thus saith the Lord: let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches: but let him that glories glory in this, that he understands and knows Me' [Jer 9, . 
